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Abstract 
This paper investigates the interactional organization of racism through participant production 
and uptake of explicit racial membership categories across a corpus of 50+ hours of audio/video-
recorded interaction in three U.S. states. The discourse analysis examines one participant method 
for addressing “hearably racist” talk: echoing extreme versions of the problematic utterance to 
provide opportunities for repair work on inferable associations between membership categories 
and category-bound activities. Orienting to implicit inferential material as the source of trouble 
licenses participant account-seeking; treating the racism as a repairable downgrades its status as 
an overt instance of racism.  
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Communication is proffered as the solution to a variety of social problems. Parents are told to 
“talk to your kids about drugs”1 (Craig, 2005). Youths are encouraged to “use your voice” and 
“speak up”2 in bullying situations (e.g., Bhat, 2008). “Just say no”3 is a common strategy urged 
for refusing drugs or unwanted sexual advances (Kitzinger & Frith, 1999). And advice about 
responding to racist comments not only suggests there is an obligation to reply4, but that replies 
should convey disapproval and question speakers’ reasoning5. Yet these well-intended 
admonitions often fail to account for how people actually interact and the multiple (at times 
contradictory) functions that talk serves. For example, Kitzinger and Frith (1999) showed that 
refusals are complex conversational actions accomplished by many tactics besides saying “no”; 
and van Dijk (1992) illustrated how talk about race makes racist identities salient. Studies such 
as these demonstrate that the societal ideal of directly addressing social problems can be at odds 
with how and why talk unfolds in particular ways. 
 This paper takes a discourse analytic approach to interpretations of racism in ordinary 
conversation. Two difficulties in pinning down “racism”—for participants and analysts—include 
(1) explicitly racist stances are rarely espoused, indeed, potentially racist discourse is often 
delicately introduced; and (2) “calling out” or otherwise obviously disaligning may be 
dispreferred, sanctionable, or face-threatening (e.g., van Dijk, 1992; Stokoe, 2015 [this issue]; 
Whitehead, 2009; Whitehead, 2015 [this issue]). This paper analyzes examples in which 
participants explicitly name a racial category, associate it with a negatively-assessed activity, and 
they or their interlocutors orient to that as problematic. 
 Drawing on conversation analytic membership categorization analysis (Stokoe, 2012; 
Bushnell, 2014) and grounded practical theory (Craig & Tracy, 1995), the analysis describes a 
practice deployed in response to naturally-occurring possibly-racist talk in recordings of private 
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face-to-face conversations. The practice involves jokingly taking the hearably racist utterance 
seriously/literally and reformulating it back to the speaker in such a way that it (1) presents the 
most extreme or saliently problematic version of the stance espoused, (2) surfaces and calls into 
question speaker assumptions, and (3) offers the speaker the opportunity to “re-hear” what they 
said and how it could be interpreted, providing opportunities for accounts and repairs. This 
practice reveals how participants manage competing interactional exigencies including 
interactional progressivity, face concerns, moral demands to address racist-sounding talk, and 
maintaining relationships with others.  
The next sections review literature on interactional approaches to racism and relevant 
concepts. The sections thereafter describe the methods and present illustrative examples from the 
analysis. The final section considers limitations, implications, and future directions. 
 
Constructing Race in Interaction 
Racism has been an important academic topic especially in critical/cultural studies and social 
psychology research. Discourse analytic research focuses on how race is constructed and 
negotiated in text and talk. Critical discourse analysts, who examine how discourse constructs 
and distributes power relations, ground racism and marginalization practices in discursive 
strategies (especially those of elite speakers), while conversation analysts focus on how 
references to race are brought up and taken up in ordinary speakers’ talk (c.f., Tileaga, 2005; 
Whitehead, 2009). Rather than defining racism analytically, the latter examines how participants 
orient to talk as possibly-racist and how this is negotiated across sequences of situated actions. 
As with other research on –isms (e.g., Speer & Potter, 2000: heterosexism) in discourse studies, 
these approaches can also be contrasted with research that situates prejudice in psychologically-
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based attitudes. Inspecting actual practices and strategies in everyday conversation can yield 
important insights into how—and potentially why—people might profess problematic stances in 
private conversations (c.f. Kurylo & Robles, 2015).  
 Membership categorization is an area of research relevant to analyzing uses of racial 
categories in talk. Sacks’ (1992) membership categorization device described how member 
categories are applied in interpretation. In instances of talk, categories function as categories 
when they are used to do categorical work, that is, to categorize people and/or their activities. 
Not every description which could be a category necessarily accomplishes this. One way 
categories work is through association with category bound activities (CBAs). CBAs are 
activities demonstrably associated with categories such that the category is interpretable because 
of the activity, or vice versa. For racial categories, a CBA is constructed when participants 
associate a race categorically (essentially/causally/naturally, etc.) with a particular activity—
what might be termed traits/beliefs/behaviors.  
For example, in the following excerpt Greg describes a lottery winner. He uses several 
potential category terms (“lady,” “82,” “black”), only the second two of which are mobilized to 
do category work, and only the last of which will require attention here: specifically, Greg 
describes the person with the racial category “black.”  
Excerpt 1 The Lottery [NH Corpus 2012] 
1 Greg: so the lady that won she's from Rhode Island she's 
2  fucking eighty-two. 
3 Kelsey: ei::ghty two she's go:ing to die:: ((in a wailing 
4  tone)) 
5  Greg: she won three hunnerd million and she's black (.) so 
6   you know she's gunna buy (.) like (stupid) shit,  
7 Kelsey: ((stretching noise)) 
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8 Greg: that's fuckin gay isn't it= 
9 Kelsey: =Yeah. 
Greg asserts that the lottery winner will buy “shit” or items that might be deemed worthless 
(lines 5-6). This activity is causally linked to race: the “so” stands as a kind of “therefore” or 
upshot (Raymond, 2004) (line 5). The use of expletives and assessment “that’s fuckin gay” 
display a negative stance toward the lottery winner’s identity and its implications (lines 2, 6, 8), 
and invite agreement from the interlocutor (line 8), which she provides (line 9). Colloquially, 
associations between racial categories and activities are the stuff of stereotypes—assumed links 
between a person’s race and what they do—as well as prejudice and racism. This is especially 
the case when the proffered CBA is negatively assessed.  
Participants’ discourse is “possibly racist” in part if interlocutors treat it as such. In the 
prior example they don’t, but this is rare. Racist discourse is dispreferred (Stokoe, 2015 [this 
issue]; Whitehead, 2015 [this issue]), perhaps partly because it is seen as a product of a racist 
person. This makes “sounding racist” a face-threatening event where face is a person’s desired 
identity/presentation of self (Goffman, 1967). Racism and attributions of racism are therefore 
delicate matters to be handled carefully. van Dijk (1992) for example describes strategies 
through which ordinary citizens, elite members of society, and media texts attempt to save face 
and deny racism in situations where racism could be attributable or is attributed. Such strategies 
seek to avoid or discredit interpretations of racism, making it difficult for interlocutors to address 
(let alone challenge) possibly-racist assertions and assessments.  
 
Responding to Racist Discourse 
Whitehead and Lerner (2009) note the importance of examining “the mechanisms through which 
racial structures are reproduced in individual episodes of interaction, regardless of whether or not 
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the discourse being produced therein is judged as ‘racist’” (p. 614). This paper’s analysis focuses 
on moments in which race categories are oriented to as problematic (if not directly called out as 
racist). This entails looking at how racial categories are produced and when they are taken up as 
suggesting a possible stereotype or evincing a possible racist stance.   
Possible stereotypes/racism makes accounts relevant. Accounts are responses to trouble 
seeking to explain/give reasons to protect one’s face (Buttny, 1993). van Dijk (1992) describes 
how participants attempt to deflect racism attributions using accounts before or after a hearably-
racist utterance, for example, explicit denials in disclaimers (“I’m not racist, but”) or personal 
stories as evidence for the stance being a truism. Other research shows how reframing racist 
stances as ordinary or reasonable attempts to account for racist discourse and construct the 
meaning of talk as “not (really) racist” (e.g., Figgou & Condor, 2006; Tileaga, 2005). 
Repair is another way participants manage possibly-racist meanings. Repair addresses 
troubles/errors in speaking, hearing, and understanding (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977). 
Repairs can be initiated by speaker or recipient (sometimes both) of the trouble-source turn, and 
may be accomplished through actions such as repeating, providing a candidate upshot, or asking 
“what?” Producers of racist talk may initiate and enact repair to suggest what they said was 
accidental or not meant as it was said. Recipients of racist talk can also request and enact repair 
on others’ talk as a way of eliciting revisions of and/or accounts for what was said. Since racism 
in general and repair by others in particular are conversationally dispreferred, this poses a double 
challenge for participants.  
Tracy and Ashcraft (2001) define interactional dilemmas as situations where choosing 
certain ways of speaking to achieve one goal interferes with achieving another, equally-desirable 
goal. Racism in discourse offers interactional dilemmas for participants because often, ignoring 
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the hearably-racist utterance is not an option; however, addressing it is dispreferred in various 
senses (c.f., Billig, 1988; Figgou & Condor 2006). A further challenge is that racism, as a 
function of membership categories, is like those categories what Sacks (1992) called “inference 
rich,” depending on unstated assumptions (culture). Participants may not always know why 
something “sounds racist” or may not always be able to explain the basis of categorizations. This 
makes it hard to ask about and hard to talk about. Bringing inferential material to the surface is, 
therefore, one way participants can put interpretable racism “on the record,” and doing so 
without apparent rancor avoids direct face threats. This is not to suggest that suppression is the 
most common (or normatively expected) response to racism—though publicly disavowed, 
(Billig, 1988; Condor, Figgou, Abell, Gibson, & Stevenson, 2006; van Dijk, 1992), in private 
conversation racist comments may be accepted or unchallenged (and therefore potentially 
maintained/reinforced) (e.g., Kurylo & Robles, 2015, which examines some of the cases taken up 
in the current paper).  
Surfacing possible racism may make racism relevant, but may be done in service of 
courses of action that have no intention of treating the racism seriously. This paper’s analysis 
examines a practical resource that exploits this ambiguity, called here “extreme case 
reformulation.” This concept builds on Pomerantz’s (1986) description of extreme case 
formulations (ECFs), in which participants use upgraders such as “all” “every” “nothing” 
“totally” and so forth to intensify a description/assessment. ECFs may defend claims or counter 
possible criticisms. For example, the phrase “everybody’s doing it” suggests a particular activity 
is common/normal. Responses to ECFs may accept or challenge them, and in the case of the 
latter the speaker may thence downgrade intensity. Edwards (2000) notes that speakers orient to 
the rhetorical force of ECFs and that quoting or echoing ECFs may accomplish exaggeration, 
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teasing, and irony. Repeated EFCs do not necessarily do serious disagreement, but can be a form 
of provocative banter that calls into question the literalness of or investment in an utterance. 
In this study’s analysis, the sequential position of the ECF comes in the response-to-a-
possible-description/assessment slot, serving as the provocation itself. It is here called a 
reformulation because it also repeats, partially repeats, or recycles a hearable “gist,” analogous 
case, or possible upshot of the previous problematic turn. Repeating, imitating, or offering a 
candidate upshot of a prior turn also serves as a way of initiating repair or making repair relevant 
(e.g. Kasper, 2004) since it halts the sequence to draw attention to the clarity/particulars of what 
was said in an action otherwise sufficient for a next turn. While also a form of “mocking,” these 
repeats are delivered playfully or teasingly and appear not to be designed as a serious challenge 
or argument initiation; however, they serve as a resource for managing the interactional troubles 
posed by more serious confrontation. 
 
Data and Methods 
This paper describes a particular environment where racial categories arise and become relevant 
as potential instances of racism, as well how these are handled in interaction. The data were 
gathered as part of a large ongoing collection of audio/video recordings including home movies, 
interviews, and ordinary interaction in three U.S. states across nine years (California, 2004-2006 
and 2008; Colorado, 2008-2011; New Hampshire, 2011-2013). The majority of the 50+ hours of 
data formed the basis of dissertation research on morality in everyday interpersonal 
communication (Robles, 2011). Originally, instances in which race was made relevant were 
gleaned from already collected-and-transcribed data for teaching examples; as the collection 
grew, interested students submitted new data based on interviews and conversational techniques 
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designed to elicit/topicalize race. The focal collection includes 26 instances from 16 
recordings/conversations. All instances were transcribed according to Jefferson transcription 
conventions. 
 These instances include all explicit references to racial categories (including 
pejoratives/slurs) which occur in three kinds of conversational contexts (categories arising 
spontaneously in the conversation, categories occurring in a topicalized discussion of race, and 
categories used in interviews about race). For the purposes of this paper, seven examples were 
relevant and six are described herein (two in detail). These examples illustrate the range of a 
particular practice present in a particular sequential environment. Specifically, the contexts are 
those in which racial categories “come up” rather than being part of a topic or asked about in an 
interview; the situations are those in which the racial category is treated as problematic in its 
uptake; the racial references include descriptions of both generalized non-present others and 
specific present participants; and the practice involves extreme case (re)formulations which will 
be described in the analysis. 
 The analysis joins an ethnomethodological interest in the moral underpinnings of 
interaction and a conversation analytic focus on sequence to examine racial categorization 
practices in conversation. This perspective explicates participants’ procedures for articulating 
and managing invoked race terms in conversation, focusing on how these terms are made 
relevant and then in various ways operated on turn-by-turn across participants’ situated actions. 
The racial categories deployed are linked to participants’ inferences and assumptions through the 
application of membership categorization analysis, which uses Sacks’ (1992) concept of the 
membership categorization device to track how categories are used and associated with certain 
activities. This paper draws on Stokoe’s (2012) description of how membership categorization 
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and sequential (CA) analysis can work together to produce a systematic account of how 
categories are put to work in interaction.  
 The analysis is interested in procedures for constructing of race in talk, but also in 
understanding and reflecting on the practical challenges of talking about race in interaction. 
Therefore, the paper’s analysis is inspired by the framework of grounded practical theory and 
discourse analytic methods which explicitly seek to inform and potentially improve 
communication practices (i.e., action implicative discourse analysis: Tracy, 1995, 2011). 
Grounded practical theory and resonant discourse analyses ground analysis of practical problems 
in participants’ discourse, investigate how participants attempt to address those problems in their 
interactions, and reconstruct the practice and its ideals on that basis. This paper analyzes 
participant techniques for responding to possibly-racist discourse and reconstructs extreme case 
reformulation practice as a resource that makes manifest certain ideals. The next sections discuss 
how racial categorizations arise and are oriented to as problematic by speaker and/or recipient; 
the sort of reformulation and recycling the recipient does in responding; and how these function 
as techniques to surface and promote possible repair on the category extent and/or reasoning of 
the CBA.  
 
Orienting to Possibly-Racist Talk 
This section discusses how racial categorizations arise and are dealt with by speaker and 
recipient. The first example displays a number of features common in the instances which were 
analyzed in this project. This portion of the exchange occurs after Christa and Val have been 
discussing having made paper maché globes in school, and Christa jokingly suggests they could 
make some now and sell them at a flea market.   
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Excerpt 2 Paper Maché Globe [CA Corpus 2004] 
1 Chris: We could sell them at a yard sale (1.8) at the flea 
2  market >you know Mexicans love that ki-< oh- 
3 (2.0) 
4 Val: N(h)o comment (.) r[((h)acist)]= 
5 Chris:          [rewind   ]  
6 Val: =ass. 
7 (1.0) 
8 Chris: du:de, 
9 Val: My boyfriend doesn’t own a globe shut up m hm m 
10 Chris:((laughs)) but if you made him one I’m sure he’d love 
11  it  
 
Christa’s self-initiated self-repair serves to display that she has “caught” herself in saying 
something that could sound racist (line 2; also confirmed by Val’s probably mock-insult in lines 
4 and 6). Here, the category association between “Mexican” loving yard sales, flea markets, and 
(ostensibly) what could be purchased from flea markets displays both a negative assessment 
(what follows and the object or “globe” under discussion illustrates that loving flea markets and 
flea market wares is not a desirable activity) and signs of trouble in uptake as well (line 4). Val’s 
“no comment” and disalignment could function as account-seeking, inviting Christa to address 
what she has said, or as other-initiated repair inviting her to withdraw the description, revise her 
assertion, or in some other way lessening the offense.  
Val’s turn in line 9 shifts to a different tactic by appearing to take on Christa’s claim 
about Mexicans in general while simultaneously refuting it regarding her boyfriend in particular. 
This approach bears some resemblance to the practice examined in more detail in the next 
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section, and while it is not exactly the same, it functions similarly to challenge the CBA, in this 
case by testing its limits or extent. Christa responds by changing the projection of her action 
from one of potential mockery (that Mexicans would like a paper maché globe) to emphasizing 
the behavior of a specific Mexican person, Val’s boyfriend, as positively receiving the object 
were Val to give him such a thing (line 10-11). Both women then imitate Val’s boyfriend’s 
possible responses to the globe using parodied Mexican accents (not shown in excerpt). Val 
seems to be provisionally buying into Christa’s stance on Mexicans or tacitly accepting it (at 
least after the initial, albeit joking, sanctions) not because she necessarily disagrees with the 
CBA itself, but with its application to a particular person. The following examples focus on a 
practice that challenges the CBA.  
 
Extreme Case Reformulation 
This section examines reformulation and recycling recipients can do in response to hearably-
racist talk. In these cases, as in the previous section, recipients seem to “take on” the category 
association (and possible stereotype) non-seriously, while doing so in such a way as to question 
the CBA’s extent or underlying reasons. The examples analyzed in this section accomplish this 
through ECFs that repeat the trouble turn or its hearable upshot back to the speaker as a way of 
making the interpretable racism explicit. 
In the next two excerpts from a conversation among three college-age women, Jill 
attributes the category “Mexican” to Christa (same Christa as in previous section’s example) on 
the basis that Christa has (and apparently enjoys) a cup of McDonald’s sweet tea, which is sitting 
on her coffee table. Excerpt 3 starts right after JR (the author6) has done a noticing of the 
McDonald’s cup followed by Jill’s assessment that McDonald’s is “evil.” Christa then accounts 
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for the presence of the cup by explaining that it contains sweet tea which is “pretty good 
actually” (line 1). 
Excerpt 3 Sweet Tea [CA Corpus 2008] 
1 Chris: it’s pretty good actually (.) their sweet tea? 
2 JR: a↑ah  
3 Jill: ((small cough)) 
4 (1.0)  
5 Jill: you’re so (like) Mexica(h)n 
6 (0.5) 
7 JR: .HH 
8 Jill: (u)kay 
9 JR: .HH HAH HAH HAH HAH [HAH HAH .HH 
10 Chris:     [(wh↑a::t) 
11 Chris: >Mexicans don’t drink te:a< (.) [they drink 
12 Jill:                   [they drink] sweet 
13  tea 
14 Chris: they drink beer. 
 
The repair occurs after a period of silence (line 4), a sharp in-breath (line 7), an emphasis (“kay” 
=“okay”: line 8) and laughter (line 9). “Mexican” is here used to attribute an activity (drinking 
sweet tea) to Christa (who is not Mexican) (line 5). Though it is not clear whether Jill is 
negatively assessing this activity, Christa displays disagreement with the association and with its 
attribution (line 11). The conversation is continued below. 
Excerpt 4 Sweet Tea [CA Corpus 2008] 
11 Chris: >Mexicans don’t drink te:a< (.) [they drink 
12 Jill:                   [they drink] sweet 
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13  tea 
14 Chris: they drink beer. 
15 Jill: [you know- ] 
16 Chris:[(I’m just)] ºsouthernº hh 
17 Jill: a:(h)ll t(h)ey drink i(h)s be(h)er (0.5) the  
18  morni::ng= 
19 JR: =.H .H .H .H= 
20 Jill: [=(with)    (     )] 
21 JR:  [with the morning’s] ne(h)wspaper: hh= 
22 Jill:  =They don’t rea:d heh heh heh heh heh heh heh .hh 
23 Christa: ◦I didn’t say that◦  
24 (0.5) 
25 Jill:  A(h)ll of the commercials I’ve seen for the sweet 
26  tea have been Mexicans and all of the ads have been 
27  in Spanish= 
28 Chris: =I don’t think- everything’s in Spanish 
Christa’s disagreement is followed by repairing the CBA to Mexicans drinking beer 
rather than sweet tea (line 11 and 13) (she also repairs the category attribution of herself to 
“southern” as an explanation for drinking sweet tea: line 16). Trouble is evident earlier in the 
gasping laughter (line 7 and 9), and Jill and Christa display disagreement over both category 
associations each has made (that Mexicans drink sweet tea or beer). Christa’s treatment of Jill’s 
categorization appears to be primarily “personal”—the trouble is that Jill has attributed the 
category to her—while Jill and JR’s response to Christa focuses more on the category 
deployment in general; this analysis focuses on the latter.  
Jill and JR mock Christa’s association between Mexicans and beer consumption by 
voicing the position in extreme case reformulations of what Christa has apparently espoused. Jill 
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says, with laugh particles, “all they drink is beer” and adds “in the morning” (line 83). By using 
the term “all” Jill makes explicit that Christa’s statement “they drink beer” implied that they 
must do this to the exclusion of other drinks, such as sweet tea. This is similar to another case in 
the data in which a participant disagrees with another’s claim of having German and Irish 
background because his having a Japanese background excludes all possible others. 
Both references in the example (“all” and “in the morning”) can be considered unusual or 
unlikely, as drinking only beer and drinking in the mornings is associated with alcoholism or 
caricature. JR further emphasizes the ridiculousness of this by suggesting they would drink beer 
while reading the morning newspaper (also laughing) (line 84), which Jill follows with “they 
don’t read” (line 85). This can be seen as upgrading the negative assessment associated with 
joining “Mexican” with “drinking beer,” implying that the assumption that Mexicans only drink 
beer would be as unreasonable as assuming they do not read. That Christa hears it this way is 
evident in her quietly-spoken next turn, “I didn’t say that” (line 86). Formulating it as something 
she did not say also suggests she “hears” Jill’s and JR’s performances as “doing” what she had 
previously been saying—as, in essence, playing a more extreme version of her. Jill then provides 
her own account for her initial association between “Mexican” and drinking sweet tea (lines 88-
90), perhaps as another way of distinguishing what she said as more reasonable than what 
Christa said. Christa does not explicitly repair what she had said and implied, but saying “I didn’t 
say that” suggests that she sees the positions being attributed to her as too extreme. This could be 
a subtle way of downgrading what she meant. 
 There were several examples like this in the data, for instance, a speaker qualifies 
“Indians” with “loud,” prompting voicings from participants about “quiet American tourists” and 
resulting in the speaker clarifying that the Indians she was talking about were loud, but not that 
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she meant all Indians were loud. These sorts of reformulations serve a reverse function to the 
typical extreme case formulations Pomerantz (1986) describes: rather than asserting something 
to defend oneself, they over-assert in such a way to indicate the opposite, to challenge someone 
else. In other words, while ECFs legitimize claims by suggesting a particular description, 
activity, or stance is normal or reasonable, extreme case reformulations do the opposite by taking 
a stance so far as to suggest it is not reasonable (see also Edwards, 2000). In the previous 
examples described, the content being worked on involves the extent of the association between 
the category and the activity.  
Directly challenging the trouble-source turn on “degree of facticity” could involve 
asking, for example, “do all Mexicans really like flea markets?” or “why do you think Mexicans 
only drink beer?” Such questions would have made relevant some account for the position. They 
would also have been more face-threatening, more disruptive to the progressivity of the focal 
action underway, and more explicitly argumentative. Instead, repeating and drawing out the 
inferences of the CBA makes visible what is problematic about it without stating it outright, and 
doing so in a joking tone lessens the face-threat. This practice of ECFs as a technique to test the 
extent of the CBA appears to be designed to elicit repair on the existence or strength of a CBA, 
with one systematically possible outcome being that of getting the speaker of the trouble-source 
turn to downgrade what they have said. This would function to remove or lessen what is hearable 
as a problematic association between a race category and a negatively-assessable category. 
Providing speakers this opportunity can allow for a “quick-fix” of the racist talk which does not 
halt progressivity for too long if the speaker complies and repairs. The recipient can address the 
moral impetus to acknowledge racist-sounding talk while maintaining myriad other interactional 
goals.  
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Extreme case reformulations were sometimes used to surface slightly more complex 
relationships between categories and activities, including not just the extent of the CBA but also 
its underlying reasoning. This appeared to be a more delicate project, for several reasons. Firstly, 
challenging reasons relates to deeper inferential matters which are not only unstated, but may be 
hard for participants to articulate. Secondly, articulating these opens up possibilities for 
misunderstanding and disagreement among interlocutors. Thirdly, these can cause trouble 
between participants and potential progressivity derailments. Perhaps for this reason this 
technique was rarer and almost always occurred in interviews or cases where race was previously 
topicalized. The following example is the only one that occurred in a similar conversational 
context as those focused on in this analysis (spontaneously arising categories). In this example 
one of the participants has been discussing her living situations. When the category “Chinese” is 
mentioned, the speaker self-repairs and displays signs of trouble with the association between 
“Chinese people” and a strange or unpleasant odor (line 10). Though she further explains that 
what she means is the food that the Chinese people in her dorm cooked (not the people 
themselves) (line 22), the other participants jointly produce a mirroring CBA and assessment. 
Excerpt 5 Smells Funny [NH Corpus 2013] 
1 Selina: I’m s:o excited not to live with girls ne- er 
2  anybody (.) next year, 
3 Geoff: where’re ya- (.) livin= 
4 Selina: (uh ka ku)[(  )]  
5 Bill:             [(  )] 
6 Selina:( )and I have to live in a fr(h)eshman dorm= 
7 Geoff: =huh huh= 
8 Selina: it’s (hard cuz I’m gonna live) right next to  
19 
 
9  Nate (.) >and I wanted a single< <but it smells funny 
10  cuz of the Chinese people- °fuck° hm [hmhm 
11 Geoff:        [hh] hah hah hah 
12  hah hah=  
13 Selina: =I mean-  
14 Geoff: hh hh 
15 (1.0)  
16 Selina: whatever huh hh 
17 (2.0)  
18 Selina: but it does it smells really weird (.) (>you guys 
19  are on<) the first floor ‘n you’re like <what is that 
20  fucking smell> 
21 (2.0)  
22 Selina: And then you realize that it is their food. 
((enunciated))  
23 (1.0) 
24 Bill: hm. (1.0) doesn’t smell like frie:d chicken 
25  ((southern accent)) anywhere else does it? 
26 (2.0) 
27 Selina: N:[o:? 
28 Geoff:    [(does]it smell like) black people 
29 ((Geoff and Bill laugh)) 
30 Selina: you guys are terrible= 
31 Geoff: =You(‘re the one that) just made fun of Chinese 
32  people= 
33 Selina: =(I didn’t) make fun of them [I just- 
34 Geoff:       [( )] you hypocrite  
35 Selina: I just said that (.) <their food sometimes> (.) 
36  when (.) cooked (.) is a li’le stinky.  
20 
 
37 (1.0) 
38 Selina: SHUT UP  
39 ((laughter)) 
 
Selina displays understanding with the trouble with what she’s said and does repair (line 10, 13, 
22), but Bill and Geoff pursue the matter further.  Bill’s introduction of another food smell (fried 
chicken) (line 24) prompts Geoff to supply an association with another race category 
stereotypically linked with fried chicken (black people) (line 28) while simultaneously producing 
an association analogous to one interpretation of Selina’s first mention: that the people, not the 
food, is the source of the smell. It is unclear whether Selina’s response is aimed at the content of 
their talk or its function to tease her (line 30), but Geoff seems to take it up as content-related in 
order to return to her earlier comments (line 31-32, 34). This suggests that his and Geoff’s turns 
serve as further repair, account, or teasing pursuits on Selina’s comments, and that she has not 
explained herself or displayed sufficient awareness of the problematic nature of her utterance.  
 Bill’s and Geoff’s analogous but more saliently problematic scenario imitates and 
reformulates a version of what Selina said. The “extreme case” here is not built out of 
intensifying words, but rather out of shared cultural knowledge in which the category of “black 
people” has historically been associated with public and media discourse about racism in the 
United States. In comparison to the previous examples, this version of the practice is also 
different because it is not just repairing the association between a category (such as Chinese or 
black people) and an activity (being smelly/having smelly food): additionally, it makes visible 
that even if Selina is talking about food and not people, there is still something problematic about 
the association, in which case it requires more than just a repair of what was meant, but a further 
examination of what the problem is. Because in this case the pursuit is dropped, it is unclear 
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what more was being pursued, exactly. In the context of an ordinary conversation in which race 
“arises” but is not a topic, this sort of eventual dropping of the subject is common in these cases. 
It could be the case that just getting the speaker to notice and display noticing is sufficient, or 
that the teasing was never intended to require a serious response.  
 
Making Racist Discourse Repairable 
Public discourses abound with advice and assumptions about what racism is and how it should 
be addressed. However, in focusing primarily on the moral imperative to address racism, these 
discussions tend to advise practices at odds with other considerations in everyday interaction, 
including progressivity, relational, and face demands. The previous sections described a practice 
for responding to hearably-racist talk after evidence of trouble. This practice served as a resource 
for attending to multiple interactional demands and involved reformulating an extreme case of 
the problematic utterance or its upshot by doing a partial repeat with intensifiers or supplying an 
analogous extreme case. In former, the practice was deployed as a technique for questioning the 
extent of the CBA in such a way as to make repair relevant; in the latter, the practice was 
deployed as a technique for questioning the reasoning behind the CBA in such a way as to make 
repair, accounts, and/or salience of the problem potentially relevant.  
 Pomerantz (1986) concludes three points in her article on extreme case formulations: that 
ECFs “assert the strongest hearing,” are addressed to the “cause of a phenomenon,” and concern 
the “rightness (wrongness) of a practice” (p. 227). This is true of the practice described here as 
well. Taking up an extreme case reformulation of the utterance or upshot of racist-sounding talk 
was a way of performing the “strongest hearing” of the utterance back to the speaker; could be 
deployed to test the strength or intensity of a claim as well as its underlying assumptions, 
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including “cause”; and called into question the rightness of the trouble turn. In classical 
logic/argumentation scholarship, this could be considered a form of reduction ad absurdum: a 
strategy of displaying the absurdity of an argumentative position by pushing its premises, 
conclusions, or consequences to their limit.  
Basing this on faulty premises would traditionally be considered fallacious (in examples 
such as ad hominem and “slippery slope” arguments) (Walton, 1993), and one can imagine that 
in different circumstances the speaker of the racist-sounding utterance could refute the validity of 
the challenge in the first place. This rarely occurred in the data (though see excerpt 4 line 23, “I 
didn’t say that” as a possible instance), perhaps suggesting that all participants shared enough of 
a frame of reference to assume that pushing their statement to its “logical conclusion” was by 
and large a reasonable thing to do; or because it was clear that the challenge was joking or non-
serious. It could also indicate that participants treat the attribution of racism as a matter of 
principle rather than a matter of degree: in other words, racism is not a scalar quality and one 
cannot be “a little bit racist.”   
That the practice described herein did not result in strongly face-threatening or 
argumentative interaction speaks in parts to its success in attending to multiple interactional 
goals. On one hand, it fulfills the moral obligation to respond to racist-sounding talk by bringing 
the hearably-racist content onto the record and making it available for uptake. Furthermore, it 
overwhelmingly seems to treat the possible racism as a fixable feature of the discourse rather 
than an attitude of a person. This point, alongside with its teasing and non-literal performance, 
could be problematic from a critical perspective, a way of avoiding taking a serious issue 
seriously.  
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Though using the practice to surface more complex inferential material was rarer across 
the data (especially when racial categories spontaneously arose), testing the extent of the CBA 
was common across cases given the condition that participants were familiar with one another. 
For instance, in the following example race was topicalized in an “interview-style” discussion 
among friends. Jimmy admits (lines 1-8) that he believes stereotypes can be based on fact and in 
line 9 Megan reformulates an extreme case of Jimmy’s prior (expanded in line 11).  
Excerpt 6 True Stereotypes [NH Corpus 2012] 
1 Jimmy: <from yah true stereotypes and from-from things that 
2  I’ve personally seen and- an how a:h certain people  
3  like to act based on the color of their skin and 
4  think that they can get away with certain things just 
5  because they’re a certain a:h race and now I’m just 
6  racist- I’m not just a:h- not just saying toward a:h 
7  black people in general but there’s other- other  
8  races that>= 
9 Megan: =I’M RACIST TOWARDS EVERYONE ((laughs)) 
10 Jimmy: no I’m just saying that there are= 
11 Megan: =((laughing))=I DEFINITELY do not discriminate  
12  against JUST black people= 
13 Jimmy:=yah well no I don’t- 
This example and others indicate that this practice may apply across environments, varying 
internally by what sort of upshot is being explicated (the extent versus the logic of the CBA) and 
conditioned by the context—here, the private interpersonal nature of the conversations. It would 
be hard to imagine this sort of practice being deployed in institutional settings.  
These conclusions are therefore limited by the data. This corpus is based primarily on 
naturally-occurring instances of possible racism, which do not often arise. Furthermore, being 
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recorded may have had an influence on the repair instantiations and organization, given 
participants in the examples analyzed knew they were being recorded at the time of recording. 
Some of the data may not have been typical, as the data evinced a range of positions toward 
racism and racist discourse. However, examples selected were key ones from a larger set and 
illustrated a general pattern of methods by which people manage racial references and possibly-
racist discourse.  
The results suggest some ways in which people might reflect on how to respond to racist 
discourse in different settings. While the practice of doing an extreme case reformulation may be 
specific to people with an established prior relationship, the techniques to which it was put are 
potentially more generalizable. For example, pursuing the fact status and extent of CBAs seems 
to work well when seeking to briefly highlight something problematic, while pursuing various 
sorts of unstated CBA instances through humor attends to the face-threat of challenging racism 
(if not addressing the problem of racism). Future research directions could examine various 
situated ideals across settings to consider how different repair attempts may or may not be well-
received.  
This analysis described a practice that draws on cultural inferences and is about cultural 
categories, involving metadiscursive moves in conversation and potentially contributing to a 
larger societal metadiscourse about the nature of racism and how to talk (or “not really talk”) 
about it. The practice involves jokingly taking the hearably racist utterance seriously or literally 
and reformulating/imitating it back to the speaker in such a way that it (1) presents the most 
extreme or a more saliently problematic version of the stance espoused, (2) surfaces and calls 
into question the assumptions of the speaker, and (3) offers the speaker the opportunity to “re-
hear” what they said and how it could be interpreted, providing opportunities for accounts and 
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repairs. The analysis described two techniques served by this practice: challenging the extent of 
the CBA, and challenging the underlying logic of the CBA.  
By grounding racism in participants’ turn-by-turn negotiations of glossably stereotypical 
associations between membership categories and proffered category-bound activities, this 
analysis described one way in which –isms are produced and challenged in interaction. Results 
offer insights into why some talk seems racist and how to think about overcoming the challenges 
of addressing possibly-racist talk. 
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Notes
1. http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/marijuana-facts-parents-need-to-know/talking-to-
your-kids-communicating-risks 
2. http://www.kidpower.org/library/article/prevent-
bullying/?gclid=CI6o2py38r8CFWuCMgodF1YAyg 
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just_Say_No 
4. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5576785 
5. http://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/people/how-to-deal-with-racist-people#toc7  
6. The author appeared in some recordings before this project existed. 
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